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GARBAGE IN, GOSPEL OUT: ESTABLISHING
PROBABLE CAUSE THROUGH COMPUTERIZED
CRIMINAL INFORMATION TRANSMITTALS
Our nation's current social developments harbor insidious
evolutionary forces which propel us toward a collective Orwellian
society. One of the features of that society is the utter destruction
of privacy, the individual's complete exposure to the all-seeing,
all-powerful police state. Government agencies, civilian and mili-
tary, federal, state and local, have acquired miles and acres of
files, enclosing revelations of the personal affairs and conditions
of millions of private individuals ...
The criminal histories in the Bureau one surmises, are collec-
tions of "raw" fact, received from many sources and recorded
without evaluation. No doubt inaccuracy, error and even out-
right falsity infiltrate the files.'
Introduction: The NCIC-Computerized Law Enforcement
The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) is a federally
2
maintained computerized data bank designed to assist federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies to combat crime. It collects seven
types of data: reports on stolen vehicles, securities, boats, articles,
license plates, stolen or crime-involved guns, and "wanteds and war-
rants" of persons sought on felony charges. In addition, a separate
division contains computerized criminal histories (CCH) of offenders.3
1. White v. State, 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 631-32, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175, 181-82 (1971)
(Friedman, A.P.J., dissenting and concurring).
2. The NCIC grew out of an experimental centralized computerized criminal jus-
tice system developed under the auspices of Project SEARCH (System for Electronic
Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories). Initially only twenty states participated.
In November, 1971 control of the centralized system was transferred to the Attorney
General of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970). Pursuant to 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.85 (1975), operation and management of the NCIC is the responsibility of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation.
3. 1974 FBI ANN. REP. 21. For a general description of the data files and their
use, see PROJECT SEARCH, INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFOR-
MATION AND STATISTICS SYSTEMS (1974) [hereinafter referred to as INTERNATIONAL
SyvmosiM]. The symposium conducted by Project SEARCH included presentations
and papers by experts in the field of computerized criminal information systems, as well
as by numerous representatives of police departments and criminal justice agencies which
have utilized the NCIC and developed systems of their own. These published papers
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Users of the NCIC include criminal justice agencies in all fifty
states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, FBI field offices, nine
other federal law enforcement agencies, and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police.
4
Many states have computer systems of their own which are com-
patible with the NCIC and which store additional data.' There are also
several multistate systems,6 urban and county-wide systems,7 and inter-
county systems. 8 At least one source reports plans to develop a com-
patible computer system by Scotland Yard which would link via satellite
with the NCIC. 9 There are, in fact, literally hundreds of computerized
criminal information systems which connect with the NCIC, as well as
hundreds more which, with minor program adjustments, are capable of
are excellent background reading for those particularly interested in technical aspects of
computerized criminal information systems.
4. 1974 FBI ANN. REP. 21; A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS,
DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 147 (1971).
5. State and local criminal justice agencies usually maintain files similar to those
of the NCIC, often to serve as a back-up to the NCIC. Many states include additional
data not included in the NCIC, such as files of missing persons, misdemeanor warrants,
and other entries not eligible for inclusion in the NCIC. PROJECT SEARCH, PRELIMI-
NARY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTIcE-LAW ENFORCEMENT TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, at 4-35 to -37 (1974). Detailed descriptions of these sys-
tems may be found in various papers contained in INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 3. Examples of state-wide criminal information systems include Arizona's ACIC
(Arizona Criminal Information Center); California's CJIS (California Justice Informa-
tion System) and CLETS (California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System);
Florida's FCIC (Florida Criminal Information Center); Michigan's LEIN (Law En-
forcement Information Network); New York's NYSIIS (New York State Identification
and Intelligence System); and Washington's ACCESS (A Central Computerized En-
forcement Service System).
6. E.g., ALECS (Automated Law Enforcement Communications System), cover-
ing Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin; and
linking systems between Sacramento, California and Salem, Oregon, and between Sacra-
mento, California and Carson City, Nevada. These cooperating systems seek to trace
fleeing felons in adjacent states. PROJECT SEARCH, PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS ANAL-
YSIS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-LAW ENFORCEMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 4-33
(1974).
7. E.g., ALERT (Automated Law Enforcement Response Team) in Kansas City,
Missouri; RAWWS (Regional Automated Want/Warrants System) in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia; and PIN (Police Information Network) in Alameda County, California. Id. at
3-15. Another state system is LOIS (Law Enforcement Operational Information Sys-
tem), a subsystem of the IMIS (Integrated Municipal Information System) in Charlotte,
North Carolina. INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 81.
8. E.g., CRISS (Columbia Regional Information Sharing System) serving four
counties in Oregon and one in Washington; and REJIS (Regional Justice Information
System) serving the five-county St. Louis, Missouri area. Id.
9. A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND Dos-
SiERs 148 (1971).
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linking with the NCIC.'0 This vast web will, in theory, make it im-
possible for the fleeing criminal to escape the law, for his record will
follow him wherever he may hide.
This note will first describe the NCIC process and discuss why an
arrest made pursuant to an NCIC transmission should be considered
a warrantless arrest. Secondly, the note will consider whether the
NCIC report, if it is not a valid arrest warrant, can itself constitute prob-
able cause to arrest. Finally, inquiry will focus on what measures can
be undertaken to utilize the vast potential of the NCIC, without invad-
ing individual rights and freedom."
While the problem of establishing probable cause remains the
same regardless of which computerized criminal justice information sys-
tem responds to an officer's request for warrant information on his sus-
pect, certain problems are especially acute for the NCIC. For instance,
each state must develop its own plan for update and utilization of the
data;' 2 hence, procedures and the quality of data fed to the NCIC vary
from state to state. Because of the intimate interrelation of the various
component systems, the NCIC is plagued not only by errors within its
own data banks, but also by errors and delays involving the other sys-
tems. An officer running a warrant check may not even know, in fact,
whether the computerized data transmittal reflects information stored
in the NCIC itself or some other interfaced system. 3 This note will
focus on the NCIC, but the reader should bear in mind that a fault
10. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIoNA RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM.
ON THE JucrcARY 93d Cong., 2d Sess., FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGRTS 32-34 (Comm. Print 1974). Indirect linkage could be accomplished by linkage
to the NLETS (National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Service), which inter-
faces with the NCIC and other similar systems. Beddome, The NLETS Upgrade, IN-
TERNATIONAL SYMPosIUm, supra note 3.
11. The scope of this note is limited to use of computerized criminal information
transmittals in establishing probable cause for arrest, and to improving the NCIC to en-
hance its reliability in establishing probable cause. Problems not discussed include use
of the NCIC computerized criminal histories at bail setting, sentencing, and probation
revocation hearings; use of the NCIC report to impeach witnesses at trial; and use of
NCIC technology to develop investigative leads through analysis of criminal patterns
and practices. Nor does this note touch on the many potential abuses resulting from
disclosure of the NCIC report to credit agencies or employers, or other uses as author-
ized pursuant to state law.
12. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21-.25 (1975).
13. In a case in the Nevada federal district court, the court and all participants
assumed that the warrant check was made through the NCIC. United States v. Mackey,
387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975). In fact, after the opinion was reported, Judge Clary
was informed by the director of the FBI that the erroneous transmission was made
through CLETS, the comparable California system. Letter from Kenneth C. Cory, Fed-
eral Public Defender representing the defendant in United States v. Mackey, to Judith
Rentschler, Oct. 7, 1975.
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in any single component system constitutes a defect in the entire sys-
tem.
How the NCIC Works
The operating concepts of the NCIC are simple. An officer on
the beat enters identifying data for a suspect by radio or a mobile com-
puter terminal. In 120 seconds or less, 4 a return from the computer
recites the suspect's criminal record, including whether he is wanted
for a crime. Similarly, an officer can enter the registration number of
a vehicle or other identifiable article, and the computer return will in-
dicate whether that article has been reported stolen. A single enquiry
triggers a search of city, state, and multistate data banks as well as that
of the NCIC. Through nationwide linkages, a criminal's record is
made instantly available to the investigating officer, thereby enhancing
the prospect of apprehension of criminals.
A hypothetical case best illustrates how the NCIC works. Sup-
pose a burglary takes place in Detroit, Michigan, in which a 1967
Volkswagen is stolen. The Detroit police immediately enter the ve-
hicle registration number in the stolen vehicles file of the NCIC. Fin-
gerprints at the scene are sent to the FBI crime lab, and are there iden-
tified as those of Jack Smith. Based on this information and other in-
vestigation, a warrant is issued for Smith's arrest. The warrant is en-
tered into the NCIC wanteds and warrants file. It is there retrievable
under multiple identifying features, such as name, social security num-
ber, drivers license number, physical characteristics, known alias, etc.
Three weeks later an officer in Philadelphia stops Richard Roe
on the road for a burnt out brake light. In the course of issuing a cita-
tion the officer takes Roe's license and the auto registration and per-
forms a routine NCIC check through his mobile computer terminal.
Roe has no criminal record, but the auto is identified as the vehicle
stolen in Detroit. Roe and the car are taken into custody.
Still later, an officer in San Francisco stops Jack Smith carrying
a toolbox in a residential area late at night. Smith's answers to routine
questioning fail to satisfy the officer. He takes Smith's drivers license
and performs a computer check while Smith waits. On confirmation
of the outstanding Detroit warrant for Smith's arrest, Smith is arrested
and returned to Michigan to face the charges there.
The crime has been solved; Smith has been brought to justice; and
the victim's auto is restored. What's wrong with that?
14. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 39 (1973).
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Suppose the reports returned from the NCIC had been wrong.
Suppose the car had been recovered in the interim, and lent to Roe,
but the police had failed to update the records. Or suppose that the
Jack Smith stopped in San Francisco was a different Jack Smith, but
the warrant reported by the NCIC had been incorrect, identifying the
wrong person. Both innocent individuals would eventually be exoner-
ated, to be sure, but not without damage. They may have spent time
in jail, waiting for the mixup to unravel. And a criminal record may
have been established and disseminated to other agencies, including
employment or licensing agencies which may have access under state
law,' 5 before the error is corrected.
Ultimate conviction of the culprit does not by itself satisfy the Con-
stitution. All the procedures leading to the apprehension and arrest
of the criminal must meet the demands of the Constitution, especially
that a person's liberty not be restrained, absent probable cause. If the
NCIC does have the potential for error suggested above, the question
arises whether the requirements of the fourth amendment are met
where probable cause to arrest is based solely upon information trans-
mitted by NCIC computers.
15. Access to the NCIC may be had under state or federal authority. Access is
limited to official use by "authorized officials of the Federal Government, the States,
cities, and penal and other institutions." 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2) (1970). Dissemination
under state law to employers and licensing authorities was attacked and discussed in
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971). The court ruled that such dis-
semination was improper. But a portion of that holding was overruled by Congress in
an appropriations act for 1972. Act of Dec. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-184, § 902, 85
Stat. 627, 642. The act provides: "[flunds . . .may be used ... for the exchange
of identification records with officials of federally chartered or insured banking institu-
tions to promote or maintain the security of those institutions, and, if authorized by State
statute and approved by the Attorney General, to officials of State and local govern-
ments for purposes of employment and licensing, any such exchange to be made only
for the official use of any such official and subject to the same restriction with respect
to dissemination as that provided for [under the Justice Appropriations Act of 1972]."
Dissemination of NCIC records is further regulated by 28 C.F.R. § 20.21 et seq. (1975),
but authorized dissemination still depends in part on state law. And most states do au-
thorize dissemination for employment and licensing purposes. Hearings on H.R.
13315 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., Ser. 27, pt. 1, at 65-66 (1972) (testimony of Richard Velde) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on H.R. 13315].
Dissemination of criminal records, whether or not computerized, to unauthorized in-
dividuals may have tragic consequences for the wronged individual. Yet federal sanc-
tions for unauthorized dissemination are limited to cancellation of the privilege of use.
28 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1970). From 1924 to 1974, however, only six law enforcement
agencies have been suspended for improperly making criminal records available. Menard
v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1028 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1974). States are free to adopt addi-
tional sanctions under 28 C.F.R. § 20.21 et seq. (1975).
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United States v. Mackey
Ideally, of course, the NCIC reports would be infallibly accurate
and would result in no infringement of the rights of innocent persons.
But the accuracy of the NCIC is only a function of the diligence of the
agencies utilizing the system, as United States v. Mackey1 6 illustrates.
On October 24, 1974, James Mackey was stopped by police and
asked for identification while hitchhiking 17 on Interstate 15 near North
Las Vegas, Nevada. The police officer's radio warrant check' s re-
vealed a warrant outstanding for Mackey's arrest for probation violation
in Monterey, California. Mackey was thereupon arrested for the pro-
bation violation, over his protest that the warrant had been fulfilled in
May. A telephonic attempt to verify the warrant was unsuccessful be-
cause the transmission did not indicate which of three Monterey police
departments had issued the warrant. During a routine search con-
ducted as part of the booking process, an unregistered disassembled 9
twelve-gauge shotgun was discovered in Mackey's knapsack, a federal
offense2" for which Mackey was then also booked. Telegraphic verifi-
cation of the Monterey warrant was then sought. A response the next
day showed that, indeed, the warrant for probation violation had been
satisfied in May, 1974. The probation violation charge was dropped.
However, prosecution on the federal firearms violation proceeded in
the United States District Court in Nevada. There, the court sup-
pressed the evidence against Mackey-his disassembled shotgun-on
the ground that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional arrest. The court
based its decision on due process alone, citing the arbitrariness of the
arrest, the "capricious disregard" of Mackey's rights, and the failure of
the government to insure an "acceptable degree of accuracy" in the
NCIC.2" While these grounds would as easily have supported a deci-
sion based on the fourth amendment, the court mentioned the critical
question whether the NCIC report constitutes probable cause for an
arrest only in a cursory footnote:
16. 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
17. Hitchhiking is a violation of NEv. REv. STAT. § 484.331 (1973). However,
the officers testified at trial that they would not have arrested Mackey for this violation,
absent a "hit" from the NCIC. United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (D.
Nev. 1975).
18. In Mackey, the officers and the court assumed that the warrant check had
been made through the NCIC. See note 13 & accompanying text supra. Although the
offending system was incorrectly identified, the impact of the court's decision remains
unchanged.
19. Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress at 3,
United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
20. Possession of an unregistered firearm violates 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(c)-(d)
(1970). Conviction carries a maximum penalty of $10,000 fine or ten years imprison-
ment, or both, for each violation. 26 U.S.C. § 5871 (1970).
21. 387 F. Supp. at 1125.
[Vol. 28
The Court is cognizant of the Fourth Amendment basis for
the arguments of counsel, but finds it unnecessary to focus on
this line of analysis in order to reach a decision. Therefore, there
is no need to resolve the issue of the status of NCIC as "reliable
informant" so as to justify a warrantless arrest and search.
22
The court, perhaps wisely, thus avoided basing its decision on
fourth amendment grounds. But, in light of the rapid expansion of the
criminal justice information network, 28 the question is certain to arise
again. Ultimately, the traditional notions of probable cause must be
examined anew in light of the failings of modem computer technology.
Framework of the Law of Arrest
The Fourth Amendment: Probable Cause
"[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." 24  Protection
against warrantless and unreasonable seizure is found in the fourth
amendment, which provides a twofold guarantee: first, that a seizure
not be unreasonable, and second, that a warrant will issue only upon
probable cause.2 5
The United States Supreme Court has expressed a strong prefer-
ence for arrests made under warrant.2 6  But in Gerstein v. Pugh27 the
Court pointed out that it has never invalidated an arrest based on prob-
able cause solely because the officer failed to obtain a warrant, so long
as the issue of probable cause is submitted to a magistrate at a prelim-
inary hearing promptly after the arrest.2 In any event, probable cause
must be determined in the neutral and detached judgment of a magis-
22. Id. at n.9.
23. In 1968, seven million transactions were made on the system. In 1973, forty
million transactions were made. Sohn, Fielding, Foulkes & Granit, Analysis and Traffic
Projections for a National Law Enforcement Communications System, INTERNATIONAL
SYMPosiuM, supra note 3, at 332. The NCIC contained 4.2 million records relating to
wanted persons and stolen property in 1974, with an additional 400,000 computerized
criminal histories maintained for criminal justice use. 1974 FBI ANN. REP. 21. Esti-
mates of the total number of individuals eventually to be included in the system range
from five to twenty million. HEW, REPORT Op TH SEcRETARY's ADvIsORY COMirrEE
ON AuromATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 232 (1973).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Probable cause has been defined as that state of
facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer and of which he
has reasonably trustworthy information which warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
26. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 96 (1964).
27. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
28. Id. at 113-14.
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trate-either before arrest through issuance of a warrant, or, in the case
of a warrantless arrest, immediately after apprehension of the suspect.
Is the NCIC Transmission a Warrant?
In a footnote to the decision in United States v. Mackey, the dis-
trict court assumed that an arrest based on an NCIC report is a warrant-
less one.29  That assumption may, in fact, be rather rash. In states
such as California, which authorize arrest as if under warrant based on
telegraphically transmitted warrants or based on a warrant not in the
possession of the arresting officer, the NCIC report might be consid-
ered analogous to these authorized procedures. However, the NCIC
transmittal should not be considered a warrant, for it lacks safeguards
of authenticity and freshness provided under these other procedures.
The United States Constitution does not define the term "war-
rant." Whether an arrest pursuant to an NCIC report is one made
under warrant depends, then, on analogy to case law which has devel-
oped around more traditional forms of warrants and upon statutory re-
quirements for the form of warrants. Although probable cause under
the fourth amendment is a federal standard, the process of arresting
a suspect for a state crime is largely governed by state law. This note
will not attempt to survey the widely divergent state procedural laws,
nor to apply these provisions to the use of computer technology in es-
tablishing probable cause. Instead, California law is used throughout
this note as a convenient model of criminal procedure.
California law has developed fine distinctions between types of
communications which may serve as a warrant for arrest. Police com-
munications may be relied upon in California in establishing probable
cause for arrest, but the degree of reliance which may be placed on
such communications varies with the type of transmission. Arrest
based on a telegraphic copy of a warrant or abstract of a warrant is
considered an arrest made under warrant.30 Arrest pursuant to a po-
lice communication that a warrant for arrest is outstanding is also an
arrest under warrant.3 But arrest based on a police communication
29. 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 n.9 (D. Nev. 1975).
30. CAL. PEN. CODE § 850 (West 1970 & Supp. 1976) provides: "A telegraphic
copy of a warrant or an abstract of a warrant may be sent by telegraph, teletype, or
any other electronic devices, to one or more peace officers, and such copy or abstract
is as effectual in the hands of any officer, and he shall proceed in the same manner
under it, as though he held the original warrant issued by a magistrate or the issuing
authority or agency...." Such a transmission will support arrest. Hewitt v. Superior
Ct., 5 Cal. App. 3d 923, 85 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1970).
31. CAL. PEN. CODE § 842 (West 1970). But see People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d
107, 112, 424 P.2d 342, 345-46, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902, 905-06 (1967). In Webb, the court
noted that police officers were entitled to proceed under a teletyped notice of a warrant
outstanding for defendant's arrest, but also mentioned that such information provided
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
that the suspect is wanted is a warrantless arrest.
32
The distinction among these types of communication is a vital one.
An officer acting in good faith may rely without investigation on a war-
rant fair on its face, even if it later turns out to be false.3 3 Police com-
munications, on the other hand, while certainly an element to be con-
sidered in establishing probable cause, may or may not by themselves
support an arrest, depending upon whether a warrant has been issued
prior to arrest.34
Of the various types of communications, a telegraphically transmit-
ted warran 5 is the most reliable. The telegraphic warrant serves the
traditional function of a warrant, that is, to insure that probable cause
has been established by a magistrate. The telegraphic transmittal does
not bear the signature of the magistrate, but the law which authorizes
this type of warrant substitutes other guarantees of authenticity.
For instance, California Penal Code sections 850 and 851 author-
ize arrest under a telegraphically transmitted warrant or an abstract of
a warrant. The telegraphically transmitted warrant must contain the
following information:
[T]he warrant number, the charge, the court or agency of issuance,
the subject's name, address and description, the bail, the name of
the issuing magistrate or authority, whether the offense charged
is a felony or misdemeanor, and if the offense charged is a mis-
demeanor, whether the warrant has been certified for night
service. 36
A crucial safeguard is added by Penal Code section 851:
Every officer causing telegraphic copies or abstracts of warrants
to be sent, must certify as correct, and file in the telegraphic office
from which such copies are sent, a copy of the warrant, and must
return the original with a statement of his action thereunder.
37
Although this section appears to afford adequate protection for
transmittals, the safeguards provided may be substantially circumvented
reasonable cause for arrest, particularly when bolstered by the defendant's furtive con-
duct and attempted flight. Id.
32. See People v. Marguez, 237 Cal. App. 2d 627, 633, 47 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1965).
33. Herndon v. County of Matin, 25 Cal. App. 3d 933, 936-37, 102 Cal. Rptr.
221, 222-23 (1972).
34. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Pen., 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Remers v. Su-
perior Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 P.2d 11, 87 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970); Ojeda v. Superior
Ct., 12 Cal. App. 3d 909, 91 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1970); Hewitt v. Superior Ct., 5 Cal.
App. 3d 923, 85 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1970).
35. Telegraphic warrants are authorized in California by CAL., P N. CODE § 850
(West 1970 & Supp. 1976).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 851.
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by proceeding under Penal Code section 842, as discussed below in
detail.38
Upon execution of a traditional warrant, the officer must return
the original warrant, with his action endorsed on the warrant, to the
magistrate who issued the warrant.8 9 Thus warrants which have been
executed, and as to which no further action is required, are culled from
the active files of the police agency. Telegraphic transmittal of stale
and already executed warrants is avoided by requiring the officer to
return the original warrant, with his action noted.
These safeguards present to the arresting officer certain minimum
assurances that probable cause has already been established by a magis-
trate, and that the warrant is authentic and currently valid. However,
these safeguards are not present in the NCIC report. The NCIC trans-
mittal bears neither the certificate of the magistrate, as required on tra-
ditional warrants, 40 nor the certificate of the transmittor as required
under Penal Code section 851. Transmittal by the NCIC is not accom-
panied by any reference to the original warrant, which is kept in the
files of the issuing agency. Any activity on the warrant which affects
its validity is not indicated in the NCIC transmittal unless the NCIC
files have been altered by an update which adds notice of that activity
to the file.
Update is the responsibility of the "user agency," the local law en-
forcement agency initiating the record in the computer.41 Long delays
in update are commonplace; delays of six months have been reported
to be typical in some police departments. 42  As Nicholas Katzenbach
testified before a House subcommittee on the Judiciary:
In the city of New York, where I now live, and many other places,
you simply cannot find out what has happened after an arrest was
made.
They have never caught up with it, it is never entered on the
papers, it is floating up there in their estimation and never entered
in, and you cannot discover the disposition of it.
43
During the entire period of such a delay, regardless of any intervening
events which may have invalidated the warrant, the NCIC reports a
38. See text accompanying notes 4546 infra.
39. CAL. PEN. CODE § 828 (West 1970).
40. Id. § 814.
41. National Crime Information Center Computerized Criminal History Program
Background, Concept and Policy at 2, 7 (approved April 1, 1976 by the NCIC Advisory
Policy Board) [hereinafter cited as NCIC Concept and Policy].
42. The Philadelphia Police Department was six months behind in 1972, and get-
ting further behind daily. Hearings on H.R. 13315, supra note 15, at 112-14 (testimony
of Walter W. Cohen).
43. Id. at 5 (testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach).
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valid outstanding warrant to all inquirers."4 The absence of safeguards
guaranteeing the authenticity and freshness of the NCIC reports should
therefore preclude treating the NCIC as a telegraphically transmitted
warrant.
A quite different type of police communication will also support
an arrest made under warrant in California. Under Penal Code section
842, arrest pursuant to a warrant is lawful even though the officer does
not have the warrant in hand. 45 Such an arrest is supported by none
of the certification requirements of Penal Code sections 850 and 851,
but rests only on the assertion of the police broadcaster that a warrant
is outstanding. The inconsistency between sections 850 and 851 and
section 842 is apparent, and renders the protection provided by the for-
mer two sections superfluous. The broadcaster proceeding under sec-
tion 842 may completely avoid the certification requirements of sec-
tions 850 and 851, while the officer arresting on the basis of the infor-
mation transmitted may proceed in precisely the same manner as if he
had a warrant in hand.
Although the primary function of a warrant, establishment of
probable cause, is served by arrest under notice of warrant pursuant
to section 842, notice of warrant is inherently less trustworthy than a
certified copy or abstract of a warrant. The NCIC fails, however, even
to meet the lower standards of trustworthiness of a notice of warrant.
A section 842 notice of warrant outstanding is accompanied by no cau-
tionary instructions regarding its accuracy. It is presumed to be and
is considered accurate as a police communication. 46  The NCIC trans-
mission also indicates whether a warrant is outstanding. However, the
NCIC notice is disclaimed by an accompanying warning to the officer
to verify the information with the originating agency. In other words,
the NCIC computer report notice is not "fair on its face," and therefore
should not support an arrest without further investigation and verifica-
tion.
Since an arrest based on an NCIC report fails to meet the require-
ments of arrests based on a warrant, it should be considered a warrant-
less arrest. The question remains, however, whether the NCIC report
by itself may constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest.
Probable Cause for a Warrantless Arrest
Grounds for a warrantless arrest were uniformly recognized at
common law. Most states have codified them. Typical of state stat-
44. This is precisely what occurred in United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121
(D. Nev. 1975).
45. CAL. PEN. CODE § 842 (West 1970).
46. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
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utes is California Penal Code section 836, which permits an officer to
effect a warrantless arrest:
1. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence.
2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not
in his presence.
3. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has
in fact been committed.
47
In addition, California Penal Code section 1551.1 provides:
The arrest of a person may also be lawfully made by any peace
officer, without a warrant, upon reasonable information that the
accused stands charged in the courts of any other State with a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year.
48
The standard for making a warrantless arrest is the same under both
sections 836 and 1551.1: "reasonable"4 9 cause to believe that the sus-
pect is a felon.
Police officers may rely on many factors in establishing probable
cause. Most important, perhaps, is the evidence presented to their
senses. In addition, they may consider information received through
official channels, as well as tips from citizens or informants. The
weight given any such source depends on the credibility that source has
earned. 50
By analogizing the NCIC report to, first, information received
through official channels, and, second, to informants' tips, the NCIC's
credibility may be more readily measured against the standard of prob-
able cause required under the Constitution.
Official Channels
Information obtained through official channels deserves only
slightly less reliance than a telegraphically transmitted warrant in es-
47. CAL. PEN. CODE § 836 (West 1970); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1970) (authority
of FBI agents to arrest without warrant).
48. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1551.1 (West 1970).
49. Reasonable cause is substantially synonymous with probable cause. Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 n.3 (1959); People v. Sanchez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 700,
704, 64 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334 (1967).
50. Where an officer seeks to rely on information obtained from an informant to
support a warrantless arrest, it is essential that he present facts and circumstances justi-
fying his belief that the informant is reliable. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969). In addition, in his application for a warrant for arrest, or at the preliminary
hearing following a warrantless arrest, the officer must present facts and circumstances
justifying the conclusion of the informant that the suspect was engaged in criminal con-
duct; the conclusory statements of the informant are not sufficient of themselves to jus-
tify a warrantless invasion of privacy secured by the fourth amendment. Id.
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tablishing probable cause. An officer may rely on such information
to support a warrantless arrest;51 but such an arrest, based on conclu-
sory statements of another officer or agency, will be upheld only if the
subsequent hearing on probable cause discloses that the officer commu-
nicating the report possessed knowledge of facts constituting probable
cause.
52
The case law on sufficiency of information obtained through offi-
cial channels offers little assistance in deciding a case where, as in
Mackey, 3 the official information is the sole cause of arrest. 4  Cases
dealing with arrests based on official information generally involve sit-
uations where the official information is corroborated or supplemented
by additional facts and circumstances. For instance, arrests have been
upheld where: (1) the suspect had already aroused the attention and
suspicion of the officers;55 (2) the information relayed from the sta-
tionhouse was based on personal knowledge of a local police officer;56
(3) an initial bulletin was subsequently corroborated by eyewitness ob-
servation of relevant detail; 57 or (4) exigent circumstances, such as im-
51. E.g., People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 429 P.2d 606, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1967)
rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 470; People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342,
56 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967); People v. Honore, 2 Cal. App. 3d 295, 82 Cal. Rptr. 639
(1969).
52. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Pen., 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Remers v. Su-
perior Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 P.2d 11, 87 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970).
53. United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
54. Justification for detention so that officers may run a warrant check is difficult
to imagine, absent some suspicious circumstances which would contribute to the deter-
mination of probable cause. Officers are not at liberty to detain individuals to deter-
mine if there are warrants outstanding against them. Barber v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal.
App. 3d 326, 330, 106 Cal. Rptr. 304, 306 (1973).
In United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975), the arresting offi-
cers testified that, absent a 'hit" from the NCIC, they would not have arrested Mackey
for the hitchhiking violation which constituted their threshhold reason for detention. Id.
at 1122 n.2. Significantly, such activity resembles that condemned in Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). In Papachristou, a vagrancy statute was found void
for vagueness, in part because it authorized arbitrary "round-up" arrests which were a
mere subterfuge for a conviction which could not otherwise have been obtained on the
real but undisclosed grounds for the arrest. Id. at 169.
Nevertheless, police organizations resist legislation which would prohibit their run-
ning a warrant check absent specific and articulable grounds for suspecting that the indi-
vidual is involved in criminal activity. See, e.g., 11 THE PROSEcuTnoR 345-46 (1976).
55. E.g., United States v. Golembiewski, 437 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1971); People
v. Honore, 2 Cal. App. 3d 295, 82 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1969); People v. Superior Court,
262 Cal. App. 2d 283, 68 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1968).
56. E.g., United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Cal. 1943); People v.
Madden, 2 Cal. 3d 1017, 471 P.2d 971, 88 Cal. Rtpr. 171 (1970); People v. Lara, 67
Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
57. E.g., Restani v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 3d 189, 91 Cal. Rptr. 429
(1970); People v. Schellin, 227 Cal. App. 2d 245, 38 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1964); People
v. Borbon, 146 Cal. App. 2d 315, 303 P.2d 560 (1956).
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minent peril of personal injury, called for immediate action. 8
Generally, reliance on police radio broadcasts, hot sheets of local
crimes, and similar official information is justified by the assumption
that the information so obtained is highly reliable to a substantial cer-
tainty 9 The risk of error, and consequent invasion of individual
rights, is balanced against the officer's need to trust without question
the information obtained from the stationhouse, particularly in poten-
tially dangerous field situations. 60  Postarrest examination of the
knowledge of the officer reporting the official information assures a
high standard of accuracy, minimizing the risk of unreasonable seizure.
The NCIC, too, is an official channel through which information
is received. But the automatically transmitted NCIC report represents
the entire memory of the transmittor, and its cryptic and conclusory re-
marks represent the entire store of information relating to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the warrant. The NCIC, as transmittor of
the information pertaining to the suspect's criminal involvement, has
no personal knowledge of the underlying facts and circumstances justi-
fying its implicit recommendation that the suspect be arrested. Hence,
no postarrest judicial examination of the "transmittor" of the official
information is available to test the accuracy of the transmission or to
encourage accurate transmittals.
As discussed above, reliance is justified by the assumption of accu-
racy; therefore, if the assumption of accuracy proves false, reliance is
not justified. If the probability of incorrect information obtained
through an official channel is substantial, then the constitutional re-
quirement of probable cause is simply not met.
Statistical estimates of the NCIC's accuracy dramatize the fallacy
of assuming that an NCIC report is reliable and an accurate basis for
making an arrest. One commentator, after studying the operation of
the NCIC in detail, estimates that the information maintained in and
transmitted through the NCIC is 35 percent inaccurate. 6' While courts
have repeatedly asserted that probable cause cannot rest on a formula
of mathematical precision,62 an officer who relies on an unverified
58. E.g., People v. Hupp, 61 Cal. App. 2d 447, 143 P.2d 84 (1943).
59. E.g., People v. Melchor, 237 Cal. App. 2d 685, 47 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1965); Peo-
ple v. Schellin, 227 Cal. App. 2d 245, 38 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1964).
60. See, e.g., Note, Field Interrogations: Court Rule and Police Response, 49 J.
URBAN L. 767 (1972).
61. DeWeese, Reforming Our "Record Prisons": A Proposal for the Federal Reg-
ulation of Crime Data Banks, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 26, 33 (1974), quoting REPORT
OF PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 604 (1968).
62. "In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
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NCIC transmission in making an arrest runs a known 35 percent risk
that he thereby invades an innocent individual's right to be free from
warrantless seizures. This high degree of error clearly makes reliance
on unverified NCIC reports unreasonable. Arrests based on these re-
ports therefore should not be tolerated under the Constitution.
Reliable Informants
Alternatively, the NCIC's status may be comparable to that of a
reliable informant, a possibility raised by the district court in its foot-
note in the Mackey case. 3  Probable cause for arrest based solely on
an informant's tip will support a warrant for arrest if the application
for a warrant reveals both the factual bases for the conclusion of the
informant and the underlying circumstances showing a reason to be-
lieve that the informant is credible. 4 Lacking either of these require-
ments, such a tip may be an element to consider in establishing prob-
able cause, but some corroboration of the tip is required to support issu-
ance of the warrant for arrest. 5
The standard of probable cause is the same regardless of whether
probable cause is determined prior to arrest at the application for a
warrant, or after arrest at the preliminary hearing. But slightly less
evidence may be required to establish probable cause where the deter-
mination is made by a magistrate prior to arrest than if it is made after-
wards, on the rationale that the prearrest neutral determination by a
magistrate is less likely to be tainted by the information which is ob-
tained in the course of the warrantless arrest and search."' The quan-
tum of proof required to establish probable cause applies as well to use
of the NCIC at the preliminary hearing. An uncorroborated tip from
a computerized informant found to be wrong one-third of the time
should not support a warrant for arrest; a fortiori, it is inconceivable
that it could support a warrantless arrest.6
7
The conclusion is obvious: probable cause requirements are not
met if in fact the probability of error, and consequent invasion of inno-
ent persons' rights, is as high as 35 percent. As the NCIC now oper-
ates, its transmissions should not constitute grounds for arrest without
corroboration. When the NCIC is nearly 100 percent accurate, only
the criminals' rights will be infringed. Until that time, however, the
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); People v. Marquez, 237 Cal. App.
2d 627, 47 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1965).
63. United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 n.9 (D. Nev. 1975).
64. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
65. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
66. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
67. See id.; People v. Aguirre, 10 Cal. App. 3d 884, 89 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1970).
November 19761 GARBAGE IN, GOSPEL OUT
NCIC databank should only be used if the information transmitted is
verified in some manner.
Recommendations for Reform
The district court in United States v. Mackey6" recognized that a
higher degree of accuracy than is currently maintained is essential if
police seek to rely on the NCIC to support an arrest.6" The Mackey
court failed, however, to define an acceptable degree of accuracy.
Three distinct agencies must share the burden of improving the
functions of the NCIC. First, the agency which issues the warrant for
arrest must develop better procedures for updating and insuring the ac-
curacy of information. Second, the arresting agency must, at least until
the NCIC reporting system is improved, assume the responsibility for
corroborating the information obtained through the NCIC before ar-
resting on the basis of that report. And last, but most important, the
NCIC itself must be improved to assist both the issuing and arresting
agencies in update and corroboration duties and to establish uniform
high standards for accuracy of its files.
Update: Keep Up the Input
Accuracy of input to the NCIC is the responsibility of the law en-
forcement agency which initiates a file.7" But, as discussed above, 71
update lags uniformly exist. No federal sanctions are imposed to in-
sure that the issuing agencies meet that responsibility. 72 State disci-
pline of reporting procedures is not uniform.73  The lack of firm en-
forcement of the federal update guidelines has resulted in a haphazard,
nearly volunteer approach to updating the files.74
68. 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
69. Id. at 1125.
70. NCIC Concept and Policy, supra note 41, at 2, 7.
71. See notes 41-43 & accompanying text supra.
72. Dissemination of records to unauthorized persons may result in cancellation
of use privileges. 28 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1970). But no sanctions for failure to update
are available. Users are "encouraged" to update promptly, and the need for strict disci-
pline has been recognized by the NCIC. NCIC Concept and Policy, supra note 41, at
3.
73. California law may serve as a model of necessary changes in the NCIC. In
California, entry of disposition reports is mandatory under CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11115-
16, 11116.6-17 (West 1970 & Supp. 1976). Failure to do so may result in imposition
of civil liability under CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1970). Bradford v. State, 36
Cal. App. 3d 16, 111 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1973).
74. "Contributors of arrest cards are urged to submit followup information on the
disposition of each arrest, but the FBI is not always successful in getting that informa-
tion." Hearings on H.R. 13315, supra note 15, at 63 (testimony of Donald Santarelli).
See also id. at 56-57 (testimony of Robert Gallati).
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Reasons for this lack of concern for file accuracy are difficult to
assess and cure. Where state law assigns the task of update to the po-
lice department itself,75 the police claim that they suffer from delay in
obtaining disposition reports from the courts.70 Other departments be-
moan understaffing and low budget allowances for this function.
77
Most difficult to solve is the loss of interest on the part of the local
police after the case has been turned over to the prosecutor.78
These problems could be eliminated by assigning the task of up-
date to the court involved in the disposition. This approach has been
successful in some systems.79 When the file is turned over to the pros-
ecuting attorney, the police responsibility for input ends. The most ef-
ficient system includes on-line computer facilities maintained by the
court which records all dispositions as they occur. The expense of this
system may be prohibitive, however, and a less elaborate system of shar-
ing the police department's terminal serves the same purpose at less cost.
One drawback to this alternative merits attention. It has been
pointed out 80 that involving the courts so intimately in police computer
systems may result in the appearance of a merging of the courts and
executive police functions. This could have unpleasant effects on the
integrity and independence of the courts. Judicial involvement in po-
lice systems presents two distinct problems. First, the use of inaccurate
computerized police records at sentencing and like hearings may result
in harsh sentences being imposed on the basis of erroneous informa-
tion, to which the defendant may have no access or opportunity to cor-
rect the mistaken portions. Second, the independence of the courts
must be maintained in order to protect the people from overzealous
police activity. To overcome the potential ill effects of cooperation in
75. This system has been established in some computerized retrieval systems. See
Rogers, PROCES: An On-Line Case Management System for Prosecuting Attorneys,
IrERNATIONAL SyMPosIuM, supra note 3, at 401 (discussion of the Honolulu program);
Hearings on H.R. 13315, supra note 15, at 47-60 (testimony of Robert Gallati on the
New York system).
76. See, e.g., Hearings on HR. 13315, supra note 15, at 130 (testimony of Robert
D. Gordon). As noted in the testimony of Robert Gallati, the courts are often under
no legal duty to report dispositions to the police or law enforcement agencies. Id. at
56-57.
77. See id. at 112 (testimony of Walter Cohen); id. at 57 (testimony of Robert
Gallati).
78. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT's CoMMIssION ON LAw ENFORCEMNT AND AD-
MINISTRAION OF JuSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SoCIETY 268 (1967).
79. See, e.g., Coundit, Rochester Police Department Infosystem I, INTEiNATONAL
SYmposIuM, supra note 3, at 71; Feder, Cable Car City's CABLE System, id. at 468
(description of San Francisco Bay Area system).
80. Stern, Considerations of Privacy, Confidentiality and Judicial Perspective in
the Development of Court Computer Systems, INTERNATIONAL SYMPOsruM, supra note
3, at 499.
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computerized record keeping, it is essential that the courts' access to
the police computerized records system be strictly limited. Use of
computer-generated police reports at sentencing and like hearings
should be disallowed, especially until the NCIC files are accurate and
the reports themselves are limited to those items truly probative of
criminal involvement. This would preclude the courts' use of reports
of arrests not followed by conviction at sentencing, parole revocation,
and similar hearings, and would also prohibit use of such records at
any hearing on application for an arrest warrant.
Corroboration: Crutch for a Weak System
Until the system is reliable, it is imperative that the arresting offi-
cer verify before arrest the information received from the NCIC. The
officer must arrest on probable cause, based on information known at
the time, or he must release his suspect. No intermediate course is
allowed by the fourth amendment. Quite the opposite occurred in
Mackey,8 however. The difficulty faced by officers attempting to ver-
ify information is illustrated well by that case. The NCIC report acted
somewhat as a referral to the issuing agency, without noting to which
agency it referred. The transmittal in Mackey indicated that the war-
rant had issued from Monterey. It did not indicate which of the three
police agencies in Monterey was responsible for the file.8" After the
officers attempted telephonic verification from one agency, they were
instructed to proceed in the "usual manner," by booking Mackey and
seeking telegraphic verification thereafter. Mackey was taken to jail
at 5:45 P.M.; verification was not obtained until 9:00 A.M. the next
day. Mackey thus sat in jail for fifteen hours before probable cause
for his arrest was verified. This is clearly inappropriate under the
fourth amendment.
In addition to the impediment created by the incomplete nature
of an NCIC report, officers seeking verification of data are hindered
by the mode of communication available. Telephonic corroboration of
the warrant from the stationhouse was attempted in Mackey, but by
then the suspect had already been arrested. Under the law, however,
arrest on probable cause must be based on information known to the
officer at the time of the arrest.83 Corroboration must be made avail-
able to the officer on the beat, before arrest, rather than at the station-
house afterwards. A combined radio-telegraphic system, as discussed
81. United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
82. The three agencies are the Monterey City Police, the Park Police, and the
Sheriff's Department.
83. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959).
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in detail below, could speed corroboration tremendously, and avoid
prolonged delay in response.
Whatever mode of corroboration is used, the financial burden
must be allocated equitably. It seems only fair that the cost of execut-
ing a warrant, including the cost of telephonic or radio-telegraphic cor-
roboration, should fall on the issuing agency. That agency is thus
spared the labor, expense, and risk of apprehending the suspect. Like-
wise, the issuing agency should bear the cost if, through its negligence,
the file is not up-to-date or accurate.
If corroboration can be made easily available to the arresting of-
ficer, at no cost to his police force, the likelihood of making an arrest
on the basis of inaccurate NCIC transmissions would be greatly re-
duced.
NCIC Modifications for Support of User Agencies
Redesign of the NCIC to facilitate update and corroboration
would ease much of the burden imposed on user agencies. It would
also enhance the overall effectiveness of the system.
Update
Update is, as discussed, the responsibility of the user agencies.
The FBI "encourages" update by sending records of undisposed war-
rants to the issuing agency at ninety-day intervals, requesting verifica-
tion. However, undisposed warrants remain in the system for one
year,84 notwithstanding failure of the originating agency to respond to
a request for verification.
This lag presents a significant risk that inaccurate records will con-
tinue to be disseminated to requesting agencies. A simple record seal-
ing program linked to the update request at the federal level would
better serve to force prompt update. If no response is returned in ten
days, the record would be sealed by the FBI. No further retrieval
could thereafter be made until receipt of a current status report from the
responsible agency.
Corroboration
Availability of a mode of corroboration and better identification
of the issuing agency would assist arresting officers in verifying NCIC
data before relying on it in making an arrest.
The NCIC can be programmed so that no warrant information
84. 28 C.F.R. § 20.33(a) (3) (1975) prohibits dissemination of undisposed arrest
warrants more than one year old, for licensing, state or local employment, or other pur-
poses.
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could be transmitted unless linked with specific issuing agency informa-
tion, including the telephone number of that agency. A change of this
magnitude would require considerable additional manpower to add the
information to existing files; the work would undoubtedly have to be
done by local user agencies. These agencies already complain of over-
work and understaffing.15 These complaints, however, should not pre-
vent improving the system for the benefit of the public.
Presently, corroboration must be made by the arresting agency
communicating directly with the issuing agency. A nationwide linkage
system, telegraphic or radio-telegraphic, could promote verification by
reducing both cost and delay.8 6 If the officer's warrant check produces
a "hit" from the NCIC, the officer would request immediate verifica-
tion through the NCIC, which would transmit his request to the orig-
inating agency. That agency would then respond with verification of
the data to the NCIC, and thus to the officer.
Three advantages of this system are readily apparent. First, brev-
ity of the initial NCIC response to an officer's inquiry is retained, while
the opportunity is afforded for rapid expansion of the data if the report
suggests cause for further inquiry. Second, verification could be made
by the officer on the beat, via police callbox, patrol car radio, or tele-
type unit, routed through the stationhouse and thence through the
NCIC switching system. Third, if the issuing agency's response fails
to support the original information (the hit)-that is, if unrecorded al-
terations of the warrant affect its validity-the new data would auto-
matically update the NCIC file. No subsequent arresting agency would
be misled by inaccurate data.
Strenuous opposition to these changes could be expected from
both the federal government and the user agencies. These modifica-
tions would certainly be expensive. A change in the system would re-
quire thousands of manhours, and a modification in the procedures of
all the interfacing systems would be required as well.
Neither of these changes would solve the corroboration problem.
No federal statute presently requires that the users verify the data at
all; they are merely urged to do so. Modern computer technology has
fostered a naive assumption that if a computer produced the report, it
85. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 13315, supra note 15, at 105, 112 (testimony of
Walter W. Cohen); id. at 51, 57 (testimony of Robert Gallati).
86. A nationwide telegraphic linkage system known as NLETS (National Law En-
forcement Telecommunications System, Inc.) currently serves as a direct link from the
NLETS center in Phoenix, Arizona, and the capitals of the 48 adjacent states; it also
links, through the NCIC, to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. However, this system
is used principally for administrative messages. No inquiries of NCIC files are permitted
through NLETS terminals. Beddome, The NLETS Upgrade, INTERNATIONAL SYMPO-
siUM, supra note 3, at 441.
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must be accurate; 7 and absent mandatory corroboration requirements,
many officers will question neither the validity of that assumption nor
the accuracy of the data received.
NCIC's Responsibility for Accuracy of the Files
In addition to requiring the NCIC to assist user agencies to update
and corroborate by changing the resources available to users, the FBI,
manager of the NCIC, must assume some independent responsibility
for the accuracy of the NCIC files. Federal law does not adequately
define the scope of the responsibility of the FBI for the data contained
in the NCIC computers. Statutory authority to maintain the NCIC is
couched in broad terms:
(a) The Attorney General shall-
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification,
criminal identification, crime, and other records; and
(2) exchange -these records with, and for the official use of,
authorized officials of the Federal Government, the
States, cities, and penal and other institutions.
(b) The exchange of records authorized by subsection (a) (2)
of this section is subject to cancellation if dissemination is made
outside the receiving departments or related agencies.
(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the
functions authorized by this section.A8
By regulation, responsibility for control of the NCIC is vested in
the FBI in equally broad terms:
Subject to the general supervision of the Attorney General,
and under the direction of the Deputy Attorney General, the Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall:
(b) Conduct the acquisition, collection, exchange, classification,
and preservation of identification records, including personal
fingerprints voluntarily submitted, on a mutually beneficial basis,
from law enforcement and other governmental agencies, railroad
police, national banks, member banks of the Federal Reserve
System, FDIC-Reserve-Insured Banks, and banking institutions
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
ation ... . 9
The extent of the FBI's responsibility under these sections has not
been fully explored by the courts. The FBI has disclaimed responsi-
bility for accuracy of the records it stores and disseminates, contending
87. See Baskir, Data Banks and Privacy: A View from the Legislative Perspective,
in SYMPosiuM: AuTomAiON iN THE CouRTs, ITs IMPACT oN REcoRD MA~xu AND REc-
ORD KEEPIrG 22 (1972).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970).
89. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1976).
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that it is a mere passive recipient of them. In Menard v. Saxbe,9 ° how-
ever, the District of Columbia Circuit specifically rejected this conten-
tion.91 Specifically, the court found no duty to investigate the facts of
remote arrests, 92 but the court ruled that when apprised that a police
encounter does not constitute an arrest, the FBI must remove all record
of that encounter from its criminal files, without formal request from
the local agency.93  Hence, records of detention short of arrest, must
be removed from the criminal files if the FBI has been informed of
the true character of the detention.
The District of Columbia Circuit suggested further in Tarlton v.
Saxbe94 that the FBI cannot abrogate all responsibility for the accuracy
of its files. 95 But that court declined to define what responsibility the
FBI does have. That issue was left to be determined by later courts.
None has yet done so.
The FBI is under an obligation to correct erroneous information
contained in its records. 96 One court has suggested that the FBI may
be required to notify all agencies to which it has sent erroneous infor-
mation that such information is incorrect. 7 The FBI has also been re-
quired to expunge records of mass arrests.98 Often, however, state law
does not permit an individual a right of access to his police record. He
may not know that a record exists, or that his existing record is incor-
rect, until the traffic officer who stops him for an auto inspection leans
in the window and asks him to step out of his car.
Although federal legislation has been proposed, there is presently
no federal law requiring expungement of records of arrest followed by
dismissal of charges, or of records of arrest followed by acquittal. The
courts have held that "[a]n arrest record, without more, is a fact which
is absolutely irrelevant to the question of an individual's guilt."99  But
the police nevertheless consider these records indicative of criminal in-
volvement' and oppose any system of expungement of records under
90. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 1026.
92. Id. at 1025.
93. Id. at 1028.
94. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
95. Id. at 1123. See also Shadd v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Pa.
1975).
96. Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
97. Id. at 1237.
98. E.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Webster,
467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
99. Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957).
100. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 13315, supra note 15, at 129-33 (testimony of
Robert D. Gordon).
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these circumstances. 10 1 A previous arrest, even if the disposition re-
port indicates that the suspect was acquitted on constitutional or other
grounds, will influence an officer running a warrant check on a suspect
and may tip the scales in favor of arresting him.10 2 These records must
be expunged to prevent the bootstrapping effect of basing future arrests
on the belief that an earlier, improper arrest indicates guilt.
Condusion
Clearly, uniform standards of accuracy are essential if the com-
puterized criminal information network is to be worthwhile. The high
degree of error now pervading the system not only diminishes its effec-
tiveness as a law enforcement tool but also threatens the rights of citi-
zens who find themselves trapped in the indecipherable reels of a com-
puterized record prison.
Congress has considered numerous bills which would alleviate the
high risk of injury to individuals, while maintaining high standards for
the system. 0 3 None has yet been passed. One bill' 0 4 recently intro-
duced by California Senator John Tunney would prohibit the investi-
gating officer from running a warrant check absent specific, articulable
grounds linking the suspect with criminal activity.10 5 This alone would
prevent the officer from arresting solely on the basis of the NCIC re-
port.
The NCIC offers vast potential for good, but equal potential for
abuse. And while it grows, monolithic and out of control, the potential
for abuse grows apace.
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